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THE LEGAL ARCHITECTURE OF NATION­
BUILDING: AN INTRODUCTION 
Charles H. Norch( 
A nation may be said to consist ofits territory, its people, and its laws. 
-Abraham Lincoln1 
I. TOWARD ARCHITECTONIC NATION-BUILDING 
In the future, a historian studying the early twenty-first century will observe a 
trend: numerous lawyers applying their skill sets to the problems ofpathological states. 
Our future historian will note that the topography of the post-Cold War international 
system was marked by weakly-governed states failing. 2 Fragile states eroded, frayed, 
and disintegrated under stress, and their internal social processes became highly 
susceptible to external forces. Powerful non-state actors, including private armies, 
operated within the porous boundaries of entities that were once functioning polities. 
Legal authority became divorced from political control as non-state actors wielded 
naked power, challenging formal state structures and instruments of governance. 
Within these unstable systems, populations suffered from personal insecurity and an 
expectation of violence. The origins of failures were often indigenous conflicts that 
manifested as intra-state violence or international wars, such as in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kashmir, Somalia, Angola, 
Liberia, Sierre Leone, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Afghanistan. In Iraq and 
Afghanistan, regime change precipitated by foreign state intervention required 
sustained reconstruction efforts. 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; Research Fellow, Ash Institute 
for Democratic Governance and Innovation, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. 
I am grateful for thoughts and comments from Laura Undertkuffler, Andrew Willard, Christopher Knott, 
and for assistance from the highly efficient library staff of the University of Maine School of Law. This 
work is dedicated tothememoryofProfessor John D. Montgomery, teacher, friend, and nation-builder from 
Japan to Afghanistan. 
1. Abraham Lincoln, Congressional Address, Second Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862). 
2. Our future historian would also note a proliferation ofliterature and research programs dealing with 
failed states and their reconstruction. See generally JAMES DOBBINS ET AL., THE BEGINNER'S GUIDE TO 
NATION BUilDING (2007) [hereinafter DOBBINS ET AL., BEGINNER'S GUIDE]; JAMES DOBBINS ET AL., 
AMERICA' SROLEINNATION-BUII.DING FROM GERMANY TO IRAQ (2003 ); JAMES DOBBINS ETAL., THE UN'S 
ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING FROM TilE CONGO TO IRAQ (2005); ASHRAF GHANI & CLARE LOCKHART, 
FIXING FAilED STATES: A FRAMEWORK FOR REBUILDING A FRACTURED WORlD (2008). 1\vo thought­
provoking books by scholars of international political economy that have become standards are FRANCIS 
FUKUYAMA, STATE-BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN TilE 21ST CENTURY (2004) 
[hereinafter FUKUYA:MA, STATE-BUILDING] and NATION-BUILDING: BEYOND AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ 
(Francis Fukuyama ed., 2006) [hereinafter FUKUYA:MA, NATION-BUILDING]. A study of comparative 
development policies with special reference to Afghanistan is presented in Dennis A. Rondinelli & John 
D. Montgomery, Reconstruction, Development, and Nation-Building: Prospects for Afghanistan, in 
BEYOND RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN: LESSONS FROM DEVEWPMENT EXPERIENCE (John D. 
Montgomery &Dennis A. Rondinelli eds., 2004). Of special interest to lawyers is JANESTROMSETHET AL., 
CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUilDING TilE RULE OF LAW AFTER MiliTARY INTERVENTIONS (2006). 
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Our future historian would observe that in these and similar contexts, lawyers 
possessing special skills and knowledge brought their tool kits to bear upon the many 
dimensions ofdistressed, failed, and reconstituting states. This participationoflawyers 
and the application of their tools inspired this Maine Law Review Symposium. The 
contributors are concerned with nation-building as generally understood in the United 
States: "state-building coupled with economic development." 3 The context is often 
post-conflict reconstruction meets developrnent4 because in this period of world 
history, "[ d]onors are compelled to practice nation-building when war displaces an 
existing regime, or when it can no longer function effectively. "5 Our contributors bring 
their own nuanced definitions of nation-building to this Symposium, but they share in 
their understanding of the enterprise as an accretion of activities designed to transform 
a state from a present pathological condition6 to a preferred future condition, one in 
which the state is a functioning participant in the world community, and within which 
the human dignity of the population is respected and protected7 Once that goal is 
achieved, the international community withdraws stabilization and nation-building 
resources, and treats the state as a target of development. 
The fundamental question is how to bring a population from a condition of 
hopelessness to one of self-governance, sustainable growth, and viable participation 
in the world community. As Michael Reisman has asked, "[ w ]hat are the strategies 
available to communities in transition, for their process of redefinition, and what role 
should the international community-an increasingly effective participant in all these 
subcommunities-take in the process?"8 From the standpoint of the legal profession, 
is there a portfolio of tasks and methods that are especially applicable to nation­
building efforts and that signal a new moment or pivotal role for the lawyer in state 
reconstruction and the associated work of nation-building? 
The aim of this Symposium is to stimulate thinking about those questions among 
scholars and practitioners by exploring whether there is a discernable legal architecture 
of nation-building. Do apparently disparate nation-building enterprises lend 
3. FUKUYAMA, NATION-BUilDING, supra note 2, at 3. Further, Fukuyama argues that "[n]ation­
building encompasses two different types of activities, reconstruction and development." Id. at 4. In this 
Article, I use the terms "nation-building" and "state-building" interchangeably. 
4. In this Symposium, Michael Reisman writes, "We use the term 'development,' to refer to decision 
processes and decision outcomes which have been designed to induce the shaping and sharing ofall values 
within and among territorial communities in ways and with consequences approximating the goal values 
of a world order of human dignity." W. Michael Reisman, Development and Nation-Building: A 
Framework For a Policy-Orientated Inquiry, 60 ME. L. REv. 309, 310 (2008). 
5. Rondinelli & Montgomery, supra note 2, at 225-26. 
6. Pathologies can range from state disintegration, to persistent armed conflict, to varied degrees of 
institutional incapacity. 
7. The state would meet the requirements of the Montevideo Convention of 1933 which prescribes, 
"the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent 
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other 
states." Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties ofStates art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 
L.N.T.S. 19. This would be coupled with the state's observance of the international human rights codex 
and associated protections for the population. 
8. W. Michael Reisman, Communities in Transition: Autonomy, Self-Governance and Independence, 
Remarks During Crosscutting Theme II Roundtable (Apr. 3, 1998), in 87 AM. Soc'YINT'LL. PRoc. 248, 
249 (1993). 
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themselves to "structure," by one definition of architecture?9 Can goals be better 
achieved by a systemic arrangement of the elements of the structure? The contributors 
to this volume explore these questions by considering the foundation and cornerstones 
of the architecture. Thus, they join a conversation initiated by the earliest manuals for 
designing a polity, such as Plato's Republic10 and The Laws. 11 Although presented in 
vividly contemporary terms, the issues that are addressed in the articles and essays that 
follow transcend the practical contexts to which they are applied. They present design 
questions and choices that animate the legal architecture of nation-building. Architec­
tural structure emerges from a design process which may begin with a sketch on the 
back of an architect's napkin, and may later evolve into a blueprint to guide site 
selection and construction of the edifice. That process is guided by principles and the 
science of planning and constructing, or "architectonics." 12 As nation-building 
experience is accumulated and appraised in the growing literature, an effective 
architectonic ofnation-building will become apparent. In the language of the law, this 
is jurisprudence. Following is a preliminary architectonic of nation-building that 
emerges from the problems addressed and the solutions proposed by the contributors 
to this Symposium. 
II. MYTH AND NATION-BUILDING 
Myths help shape the human ordering of things, and nation-building professionals 
initially encounter three such myths. 13 The first myth has to with the contemporary 
nation-state, the second with the constitutions of nascent states, and the third with the 
nation-building enterprise itself These myths are important, in that they express "a 
pattern of stable perspectives among the members ofa collectivity. " 14 Myths and myth 
systems cannot be ignored, as their features constitute part of the operational code 
within any community. 
The first myth bearing directly on nation-building is the belief that the contem­
porary nation-state is resilient, enduringly sovereign, and a custodian of its popula­
tion15 Since the Treaty of Westphalia, populations have looked to nation-states to 
9. WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF TilE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 109 (2001) (defining 
architecture as "the structure of anything"). 
10. PIATO, THE REPUBLIC (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books 1968). 
11. PIATO, THE LAWS (Trevor J. Saunders trans., Penguin Books 1970). 
12. WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF TIIEENGLISHLANGUAGE 109 (2001). 
13. A.V. Dicey wrote that "[t]he whole body of beliefs existing in any given age may generally be 
traced to certain fundamental assumptions which at the time, whether they be actually true or false, are 
believed by the mass of the world to be true with such confidence that they hardly appear to bear the 
character ofassumptions." A.V. DICEY, LECTURES ON TIIEREIATIONBETWEENLAWAND PUBLIC OPINION 
IN ENGLAND DURING TilE NINETEENTH CENTURY 20 (2d ed. 1914). 
14. Harold D. Lasswell & Allan R. Holmberg, Toward a General Theory of Directed Value 
Accumulation andInstitutional Development, in PoLmCALAND Am.1INISTRATIVEDEVELOPMENT3 54, 380 
(Ralph Braibanti ed., 1969). 
15. Thomas Hobbes wrote, 
This is the Generation of that great Leviathan ... One Person of whose Acts a great 
Multitude, by mutual Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the 
Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think 
expedient, for their Peace and Common Defense. 
THO:MAS HOBBES, LEVIATIIAN 89-90 (Ernest Ryhs ed., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1914) (1651). 
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satisfy a wide range of needs. Operating in a world community of similarly organized 
units, these territorial political arrangements provide security for citizens while also 
serving as bases of state power. In return for security, the people cede control and 
confer an expectation of authority upon ruling state elites. This bargain is a foundation 
of the state system and forms the delicate balance upon which world order turns. 16 For 
large swaths of the world's population, this myth has been shattered. 
In the post-Cold War international system, the myth of the state as protector and 
provider ofvalues resonated for much ofthe planet. But increasingly, weak and fragile 
states collapsed and their sovereignty was pierced. People living within their borders 
were often engulfed by armed conflict, and their human rights denied. Failed states 
harbored exportable violence and became problems for an international system that 
lacked the institutional capacity to address such problems. 
The United Nations Charter did not contemplate the collapse or disintegration of 
a state. Itpresumed effective communication among sovereign governments and their 
elites, and a range of action available to the Security Council, including provisional 
measures, sanctions short of force, and possibly coercion. 17 However, these instru­
mentalities were designed to bring pressure upon a cohesive form of supra-national, 
political organizations: functioning states. By the late twentieth century the problem 
of failing states was becoming an urgent challenge, 18 and with the September 11, 2001 
attacks on world public order, it was apparent that disintegrating and failed states were 
"threat[s] to the peace" in the words of the United Nations Charter19 Since preventing 
threats to the peace was a fundamental purpose of the United Nations, 20 the world 
community carne to appreciate that addressing this geme of threat would require new 
approaches: strengthening fragile states, and the corollary imperative ofreconstructing 
failed states through comprehensive nation-building efforts21 
16. This has been so, more or less, since 1648 when the Thirty Years War ended in Europe with the 
treaties ofMOnster and OsnabrOck, and the Westphalian State System emerged. Some scholars argue that 
the nation-state state system predates 1648. They assert that it originated with the Concordat ofWorms in 
1122 because the Investiture Struggle established a property right corresponding to sovereign territory as 
it established "the right of kings to the income from the territory defined by the domain of each bishop." 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Popes, Kings and Endogenous Institutions: The Concordat ofWorms and the 
Origins ofSovereignty, 2 INT'L. STUD. REv. 93, 94 (2000). 
17. See U.N. Charter arts. 39-51 (outlining appropriate responses to "threats to the peace, breaches of 
the peace, and acts of aggression"). 
18. See generally Chester Crocker, Engaging Failing States, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 32. 
19. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
20. Id. art. 1, para. 1. 
21. Because no part of the system effectively helped countries transition from war to peace, Secretary 
General Kofi Annan proposed a Peacebuilding Commission, the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change, as a key reform to fill the hole in the United Nations institutional machinery. See The 
Secretary-General, Note, Follow-Up to the Outcome ofthe .Millenium Summit, U.N. Doc A/59/565 (Dec. 
2, 2004). The U.N. Security Council, acting concurrently with the General Assembly, established the U.N. 
Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisorybodyin December2005. See S.C. Res. 1645, 
~ 1, U.N. Doc SIRES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005). The Commission has a standing Organizational Committee 
comprising seven members of the Security Council including the permanent members, seven members of 
the Economic and Social Council, five top providers of contributions to the U.N. budget, and five top 
providers of military personnel and civilian police to United Nations missions. Id. ~ 4. International 
financial institutions, such as theWorldBank and the International Monetary Fund are invited to participate 
in meetings of the Commission. Id. ~ 9. Its main purposes are: 
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The character of state sovereignty was changing as states became interdependent 
and then adjusted to the many external forces of globalization. 22 Such forces included 
pressures from the international finance and trade systems, drug cartels, private armies, 
and the positive evolution of the international human rights system. These emerging 
conditions of international life were buffeting the long presumed robust character of 
the sovereign state and its institutions. As was observed by Judge Alvarez in the Corfu 
Channel Case: 
By sovereignty, we nnderstand the whole body ofrights and attributes which a State 
possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of all other States, and also in its relations 
with other States. Sovereignty confers rights upon States and imposes obligations on 
them. 
This notion has evolved, and we must now adopt a conception of it which will 
be in harmony with the new conditions of social life. We can no longer accept 
sovereignty as an absolute and individual right of every State .... The sovereignty 
of States has now become an institution, an international social fimction of a 
psychological character, which has to be exercised in accordance with the new 
international law. 23 
Sovereignty was not absolute. 24 It had been changing to reflect the reality of the 
world social process, yet sovereignty remained an important technique wielded by state 
elites and it performed a stabilizing international function that remained central to 
world public order. It had helped solve a problem of the anarchical state system: 
"[H]ow is order maintained in international politics?"25 Without order, the fear was 
that the international system would collapse into an absolute Hobbesian environment, 
for which failed states are a conditioning factor. 
However, the old myth was giving way to a view of sovereignty based in part on 
the Universal Declaration ofHumanRights, which stated, "The will ofthe people shall 
be the basis of the authority of the government. " 26 The old bargain had begun to 
(a) [t]o bring together relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose 
integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; (b) [t]o focus attention 
on reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict. 
and (c) [t]o provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all 
relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help 
endure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of 
attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery. 
!d. F. 
22. See the discussion of sovereign power and the challenge presented by private military actors in this 
volume. Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Rise of Outsourcing in Modern Wm:fare: Sovereign 
Power, Private Military Actors, and the Constitutive Process, 60 ME. L. REv. 429 (2008). 
23. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 43 (Apr. 9, 1949) (individual opinion of Judge 
Alvarez). 
24. C. Wilfred Jenks' observation that "[s]overeignty is not absolute, but divisible" was increasingly 
apparent. He had observed that this was "inconceivable to the dogmatic school of thought" represented by 
Hobbes' Leviathan, "which regarded the essence of sovereignty as being its absolute quality." C. Wn,FRED 
JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADniDICATION 499 (1964). 
25. HEDLEY BUlL, THEANARCIITCALSOCIETY 51-73 (1977). 
26. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21, para. 3, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1stplen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
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change from the peoples' ceding of power to the sovereign in return for security to the 
peoples' ceding of power to the sovereign in return for guarantees of rights. Where 
absolute sovereignty was about state security, popular sovereignty is about human 
dignity. Popular sovereignty has changed expectations about state behavior and is a 
component ofboth state-building design and the legal architecture ofnation-building. 27 
For states that were pathologically weak, the technique of sovereignty became an 
imperfect tool as territorial integrity carne under critical challenge. 28 Francis 
Fukuyarna wrote, "Sovereignty and the nation-state, cornerstones of the Westphalian 
system, have been eroded in fact and attacked in principle, because what goes on inside 
states-in other words, their internal governance-often matters intensely to other 
members of the international systern." 29 Interventions, both humanitarian and 
strategic-based, resulted in the removal ofodious regimes and nation-building projects 
that assumed traditional state functions. One scholar notes that "[t]he statebuilding 
practices of international administrations reveal a sovereignty paradox: international 
administrations compromise a fundamental aspect of a political community's 
sovereignty by violating its right to self-governance, but do so with the aim of making 
it sovereign with regard to the relations between state and society. "30 In short, for 
collapsed states, traditional sovereignty was an empty shell. 31 
27. United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote in 1992, "While respect for the 
fundamental sovereignty and integrity of the state remains central, it is undeniable that the centuries-old 
doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands, and was in fact never so absolute as it was 
conceived to be in theory." Bhoutros Bhoutros-Ghali, Empowering the United Nations, FOREIGN AFF., 
Winter 1992-93, at 89, 98-99. In his 1999 annual speech to the U.N. General Assembly, Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan stated, 
The sovereign state, in its most basic sense, is being redefined by the forces ofglobalization 
and international cooperation. The State is now widely understood to be the servant of its 
people, and not vice versa .... [I]t is not the deficiencies of the Charter which have brought 
us to this juncture, but our difficulties in applying its principles to a new era-an era when 
strictly traditional notions of sovereignty can no longer do justice to the aspirations of 
peoples everywhere to attain their fundamental freedoms. 
U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th plen. mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7136 (Sept. 20, 1999). 
28. The principle of territorial integrity of states is a central goal of the United Nations. See U.N. 
Charter art. 2, para. 7 ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."). 
29. FUKUYAMA, STATEBUTI.,DING, supra note 2, at 92. 
30. DO:MINIK ZAUM, THE SOVEREIGNTY PARADOX: THE NORMS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
STATEBUILDING 27 (2007) (footnote omitted). Zaum further notes that 
[t]he institution of sovereignty is central to understanding the normative framework 
underlying the statebuilding activities of the international administrations. By establishing 
international administrations and denying self-governance to the affected populations, the 
international community compromises one of the fundamental aspects of sovereignty, the 
norm of self-determination. However, as sovereignty is closely related to the notion of 
statehood, arguably even constitutive ofit, it is the institution which necessarily incorporates 
the relevant elements of the normative framework that shapes statebuilding. The 
relationship bet\veen sovereignty and statebuilding is therefore a complex and seemingly 
contradictory one. 
I d. 
31. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht concluded that 
sovereignty is not in the nature of an absolute and rigid category, but that, being no more 
than a bundle of rights, it is capable ofdivision and separation in a manner permitting areal 
measure of competence on the part both of the residuary sovereign and of the authority 
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Yet the shell, this structure without walls, could suddenly find itself with a roof: 
a newly drafted constitutional text. While potentially important, to the population the 
new text is often very much a myth. To the nation-building lawyer the new constitution 
may appear to apply, while other long-standing nonnative systems are in fact applied. 
This is because societies and communities possess multiple relevant normative 
systems. The nonnative code relied upon by officials is actually a myth system and its 
reliability for normative guidance will vary. Often far more important is the unofficial 
normative system which operates as the real operational code. 32 As the entrenched 
normative system of the populace, the operational code will prevail over any new 
constitution and codified law. 33 
This divergence of official and unofficial normative systems was especially 
apparent during earlier eras marked by what Noah Feldman has termed "imposed 
constitutionalism." As he writes, 
[ a]lthough the wholesale imposition of an entire constitutional order is increasingly 
rare, constitutions are being drafted and adopted in the shadow of a gllll. In the last 
decade, in the former Yugoslavia, East Timor, Afghanistan, and ... Iraq, interim or 
permanent constitutions have been drafted llllder the conditions ofde facto or de jure 
occupation. Each of the cases has also seen substantial local participation in the 
constitutional process; but each has also seen substantial intervention and pressure 
imposed from outside to produce constitutional outcomes preferred by international 
actors .... Yet there is something theoretically and practically distinctive about 
imposed liberal constitutionalism today: it takes place against a backdrop of 
widespread commitment to democratic self-determination. 34 
While there are often demands for indigenous participation in the process, the catalyst 
is likely to be external-spawned by international actors and nation-building lawyers 
who are trained in foreign legal systems. The indigenous commitment may be to a 
form of self-determination and to a myth of Western style democracy. 
Donald Horowitz raises the real possibility that constitutional design is an 
oxymoron, and pointedly writes that "there is no agreement on the political and 
constitutional arrangements most likely to be conducive to peace and accommodation 
in a democratic context. " 35 This is at the base of the problem of constitutional myth 
charged with its total or partial exercise. 
SIR HERSCHLAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONALLAWBY TilE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
324-25 (1958). 
32. See W. MICHAELREIS:MAN, FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY, CRUSADES, AND REFORMS 16 (1979). 
33. 	As one scholar classically observed, 

I shall continue to do my best to clarify the process and the law of interpretation, of both 

words and acts as symbols of expression; to demonstrate that no man can determine the 

meaning of written words by merely gluing his eyes within the four comers of a square 

paper; to convince that it is men who give meanings to words and that words in themselves 

have no meaning . 

Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNElL L. Q. 161, 164 
(1965). 
34. Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CoNN. L. REv. 857, 858-59 (2005) (citations 
omitted). 
35. Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?, in DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS 253, 253-54 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000). 
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for newly constituted states. The same attention that is devoted to drafting fhe text 
must also be devoted to the process of grounding fhe new document until the 
population of the state accepts it as authoritative. In new states especially, the 
constitution is more process than text. As the Roman jurist Papinian wrote, "Lex is a 
common engagement of the Republic."36 In other words, the people assumed a 
common responsibility because they participated in assenting to the law. This same 
participatory imperative must ground post-conflict constitutive processes in order to 
contribute to a stable, governable future that will represent a break with fhe past. For 
example, in post-conflict states such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the constitutive process 
must take root in the teahouses and rnosques. 37 
Nation-builders drafting constitutional texts and codified laws must sift through 
both the myth system and fhe operational code in order to determine which processes 
of community decisions are both aufhoritative and controlling. A newly drafted 
constitution may be a myth while what people actually do in informal settings is the 
accepted code of operation. The experience of most failed states that are candidates 
for nation-building is that of a pre-constitutional moment marked by fhe absence of 
political authority and state control. While "[t ]he primary function of any constitution 
is to manage power, a critical feature of which is the prevention of destructive 
conflict, " 38 in these settings, power centers are contested and the constitution is not the 
prevailing operational code. 
Myths serve important functions at every level of community. Plato wrote of the 
noble lie to facilitate an ordered and just society. 39 There is also fhe noble lie of 
nation-building, and it too serves a just cause. For the interveners and the beneficiaries 
(or targets) of nation-building, fhe whole enterprise must be elevated to a high order 
goal of the international community. Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa 
Brooks have recently observed that 
[i]nterventions are a costly and dangerous business, diverting government resources 
away from domestic priorities and risking the lives of the intervening power's 
soldiers. The electorates of western nations are often loathe to support expensive, 
risky foreign ventures that offer few clear short-term domestic dividends. Because 
modem international and domestic norms forbid interventions designed explicitly to 
exploit resources ofother states, today' s interventionists must generall ymake a public 
conunitrnent to building just, democratic, peaceful and prosperous societies in the 
areas that they control, if they are to avoid worldwide condenmation. Yet building 
36. CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 50 (rev. ed.1947) 
(1940). 
37. In Afghanistan, the constitutive process was characterized by discrepancies between preferences 
about how decisions are made versus how they should be made. Formal authority was minimal and 
dispersed, effective control was spotty and rarely applied from the administrative and governmental center 
ofthe country, Kabul. There had long been a disconnect bet\veen formal authority and effective control. 
See Charles H. Norchi, Toward the Rule ofLaw in Afghanistan: The Constitutive Process, in BEYOND 
RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN, supra note 2, at 115. 
38. Nagan & Hammer, supra note 22, at 430. 
39. The "noble lie" was a persuasive device, a myth devised and observed for the common good. See 
PlATO, supra note 10, at 93. Indeed, one scholar commenting on Plato's work notes that "it is baldly 
stated [in the Republic] that the only truly just civil society must be founded on a lie." Allan Bloom, 
Preface to PIA TO, supra, at xv. 
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just and prosperous societies is complex and requires intervening powers to make 
virtually open-ended conunitrnents of resources and people to post-intervention 
societies-which is, again, likely to be less popular with domestic constituencies 
concerned about how their tax dollars are spent. 40 
The noble lie of nation-building signals to the world community that the cause is just. 
The communication might assure populations who must tolerate intervention, 
disruption, and occupation while hoping for the pay-off of a functioning state and 
human dignity. It might mollify the taxpaying citizen of the intervening country who 
foots the bill. It helps to comfort families who lose loved ones serving in far away 
lands. The function and limitations of the noble lie must be recognized by nation­
building participants. 
III. SPACE FOR STA1E-BUILDING 
Ensuring the human dignity of the beneficiary population is one of the 
foundational justifications for nation-building projects. As a practical matter, this is 
also a precondition for progress on any other reconstruction front. Conditions of 
extreme crisis shaped by chaos, indiscriminate killing, targeted attacks, insurgency, and 
persistent conflict must be addressed before extensive nation-building can occur. The 
continuing problem is that ungoverned space will be filled by chaos because frayed, 
faux, and failed states lack the capacity to monopolize power. Security for the 
population must be achieved in the earliest phases of nation-building and sustained 
throughout the process. 
In this writer's view, the achievement of a condition of centrally-authorized state 
power is a critical component of the legal architecture of nation-building. As Francis 
Fukuyama has observed, "[i]n post-conflict reconstruction operations, adequate 
security is the absolute sine qua non of success."41 Legal tasks may overlap and be 
conducted in parallel with stability operations, because of the need for institutional 
coordination in fluid environrnents. 42 Those who have political power use it to achieve 
their objectives, and when those objectives are hostile to the goals of nation-building, 
those exercises of power must be addressed, by military means or otherwise. 
Illegitimate and unauthorized action grounded in sheer power must be curtailed. 43 
A Rand Corporation nation-building study recently concluded that "[t]he first­
order priorities for any nation-building mission are public security and humanitarian 
40. STROMSETHET AL., supra note 2, at4. 
41. FUKUYAMA, NATION-BUTI.,DING, supra note 2, at 234. 
42. U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine holds that it is important 
to identify existing coordination mechanisms and incorporate them into comprehensive 
[counterinsurgency] efforts. This includes existing U.S. Government, multinational, and 
[host-nation] mechanisms. Context is extremely important .... The nature of the conflict 
and its focus on the populace make civilian and military unity a critical enabling aspect of 
a COIN operation. 
U.S. ARMY & MARINE CORPS, COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL 69 (2007) [hereinafter 
COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL]. 
43. This includes illegitimate action from all quarters, including the ranks of the nation-builders. Id. 
at 42 ("Illegitimate actions are those involving the use ofpowerwithout authority-whether committed by 
government officials, security forces, or counterinsurgents."). 
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assistance. "44 The study prioritizes the relevant tasks in this order: security, hurnanitar­
ian relief, governance, economic stabilization, democratization, and development. 
Always, the first order ofbusiness is building the space necessary for nation-building, 
and that requires stabilization, peacekeeping, and police and security sector reform. 
Security operations cannot be conducted acontextually or absent integrated planning. 
Strom seth, Wippman, and Brooks observe that "[b ]ecause sustainable security requires 
at least minimally functioning state institutions, security efforts are meaningful only if 
undertaken as part of a larger post-conflict reconstruction and rule of law project."45 
Security is the precondition of effective legal reform, yet security itself is dependent 
on the formal existence, at least, of operational law and state institutions. 
Because contemporary nation-building typically combines state-building and 
military operations, there has been rethinking of the strategic environment in the 
American security policy community. United States Anny operational thernes46 now 
explicitly include peacekeeping, peace building, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and 
conflict prevention. Along the spectrum of conflict from stable peace, to unstable 
peace, to insurgency and general war, peace operations would fall in the rniddle. 47 
Much civilian nation-building work occurs in conjunction with Army stability 
operations. These operations are described as "various military missions, tasks, and 
activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments 
of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment, provide 
essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and 
humanitarian relief "48 The goal of these operations is to help "establish a safe and 
secure environment and facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries" 
and to "help establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions and support the 
transition to legitimate local governance. [They] ... must maintain the initiative by 
pursuing objectives that resolve the causes of instability."49 
Recognizing and resolving the root causes of instability are especially important 
and difficult under conditions of insurgency. Afghanistan and Iraq are two contexts 
in which nation-building programs have been implemented while counterinsurgency 
(COIN) operations50 are conducted. The current US. Army and Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency Field J\1anual connects nation-building goals and civilian 
participation to military counterinsurgency operations: 
44. DOBBINSET AL., BEGINNER'S GUIDE, supra note 2, atxxiii; see also id. at 47-72. 
45. STROMSETHET AL., supra note 2, at 140. 
46. As the most recent Army field manual notes, "An operational theme describes the character ofthe 
dominant major operation being conducted at anytime within a land force commander's area of operation 
Operational themes have implications for task-organization, resource allocation, protection and 
tactical assignment." DEP'T. OF TilE ARMY, FIElD MANUAL 2-3 (2008) [hereinafter FIELD MANUAL]. 
47. Id. at 2-1. 
48. Id. at 3-12. 
49. Id. ("Stability operations can be conducted in support of a host-nation or interim government or 
as part of an occupation when no government exists. Stability operations involve both coercive and 
constructive military actions."). 
50. Id. at 2-55 ("Counterinsurgency is those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, 
and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. In counterinsurgency, host-nation forces and 
their partners operate to defeat armed resistance, reduce passive opposition, and establish or re-establish 
the host-nation government's legitimacy."). 
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The cornerstone ofany COIN effort is establishing security for the civilian populace. 
Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and 
disorder spreads. To establish legitimacy, conunanders transition security activities 
from combat operations to law enforcement as quickly as feasible. \Vhen insurgents 
are seen as criminals, they lose public support. Using a legal system established in 
line with local culture and practices to deal with such criminals enhances the [Host 
Nation] government's legitimacy. 51 
To achieve this, "[ s ]oldiers and Marines help establish [host nation] institutions that 
sustain that legal regime, including police forces, court systems and penal facilities. "52 
Thus, contemporary state-building efforts integrate civilian and military 
components. What does this integration mean in concrete terms? One model is the 
Provincial Reconstruction T earn (PRT), which is designed for service delivery and 
basic state-building activities in rural areas where the central government has minimal 
or no reach. The configuration ofPRTsin Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance, vary by 
region and supervisory authority. The units are typically staffed by 50 to 300 troops 
and include development professionals and diplomats. They generally function in 
high-risk environments where there is little non-governmental organization penetration. 
The units typically work on infrastructure projects, law and governance, and security 
sector reform. Because of the tremendous variability in local conditions in 
Afghanistan,"[ e ]ach PRT leadership team received tremendous latitude to determine 
its own strategy."53 The PRT model is still evolving through experience and applica­
tion, and has not been without problems. One close observer recommends "the PRTs 
should place greater emphasis on capacity-building programs that improve local 
governance and help tie local officials and institutions to the central government."54 
However, a model that mixes humanitarian and military components carries risks. 
How are the tasks divided? Does the local population understand this integration of 
humanitarian and military actors? If there is hostility toward the military operation, do 
humanitarian organizations operating in the vicinity face increased risk? 
In this Symposium, Winston P. Nagan and Craig Hammer critique the use of 
another model used to help create the space for nation-building: Private Military 
51. COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 42, at 42. In connecting nation-building and 
counterinsurgency, 
[t]he field manual stresses the role of politics and outlines an ideal balance of civil and 
military responsibilities in COIN. The manual highlights military dependence not simply 
upon civilian political direction at all levels of operation, but also upon civilian capacities 
in the field .... Equally important, success in COIN relies upon nonkinetic activities like 
providing electricity, jobs, and afunctioningjudicial system. This wide S\Vath ofoperational 
capacities for nation-building do not reside in the U.S. armed forces. 
Id. at xxix-xxx. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 73. 
54. Michael J. McNerney, Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a 
Muddle?, PARAMETERS, Winter 2005-06, at 32, 45. McNerney, a senior U.S. government official, 
concluded that in Afghanistan, "the PRTs gre\V increasingly effective in supporting security-sector-related 
capacity-building in the provinces .... It would be beneficial if the PRTs can also play a role in supporting 
judicial capacity-building programs, which the international community has implemented far too slowly." 
Id. at 42-43. 
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Contractors (PMCs) and Private Security Contractors (PSCs). Nagan and Hammer 
appraise this model and its implications for world order For instance, they note that 
through reliance ofPMCs andPSCs, "the line between combat operations and service 
delivery has been noticeably indistinct; there has been an alarming lack of clarity as to 
when private military actors have assumed combat roles versus when they have been 
limited to training, and other non-combat roles. "55 The authors appraise the difficulties 
created by the use of these actors that are disconnected from sovereign power, and 
argue that these institutions "are not supported by traditional, appropriate sources of 
authority, even though national sovereigns are a key part of this process of assigning 
sovereign power." 56 They write that "[t]he constitutive implications arising from 
military privatization efforts are particularly grave, especially where political leaders 
are able to operate outside norm-generating forces, including public scrutiny, 
government oversight, and domestic and intemationallaw."57 
One alternative to private military and security contractors is greater reliance on 
traditional national armies, and the lawyers serving in their ranks. US. Army Judge 
Advocate Dan E. Stigall urges reliance on the US. military because of its unique 
combination of capabilities that include legal capacity. He argues, 
[m]ilitary assets are the preferred choice for the task of state-building for many 
reasons. One reason is that their presence is a generally indispensable element ofany 
state-building operation. Another reason ... is the modem military's diverse and 
robust contingent ofprofessionals. The armed forces of the United States regularly 
deploy, not only with skilled infantrymen and other "combat arms" soldiers, but with 
a host of trained professionals such as physicians, lawyers (Judge Advocates), and 
engineers-all ofwhom are uniformed service members .... Specifically in the legal 
realm, the armed forces possess a corps of educated, trained, and skilled attorneys 
who regularly practice law within the United States and abroad .... They are able to 
operate in post-conflict states and assist in rebuilding or developing legal 
infrastructure. 58 
This solution meets the "security first" imperative of nation-building. But does it 
unevenly tip the civilian-military balance in the architecture of nation-building? 
Ensuring the security of the population requires addressing crime. Writing in this 
Symposium, James Cavallaro explains this is a matter of "transitional justice, 
55. Nagan & Hammer, supra note 22, at 437. 
56. I d. at 448. 
57. Id. at 433 (footnote omitted). 
58. Dan E. Stigall, Comparative Law and State-Building: The "Organic Minimalist" Approach to 
Legal Reconstruction, 29 LOY. L.A. INT'L & Co:MP. L. REv. 1, 40 (2007). Stigall further argues that 
[ d]elegating the primary responsibility oflegal reconstruction to the Judge Advocates whose 
presence is already required in post-conflict settings, economizes the assets already in use 
while achieving a unity of command which is unattainable with non-governmental entities. 
Thus, they are not only suitable for the job of legal reconstruction, but they are, in many 
ways, ideal. 
Id. at41. 
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democratic stability, and nation-building."59 He notes that "insufficient attention has 
been paid during the transitional era to addressing ordinary crime during transitions 
and beyond."60 Nation-building efforts must devote enhanced attention "to common 
crime and to the establishment of transparent, efficient, and democratic police and 
criminal justice systems to control it. "61 This requires detailed planning amidst the 
rush to state-building. Space for state-building means protecting vulnerable 
populations from crime, insurgency, and armed conflict. The problem from the policy 
perspective is how to minimize unauthorized coercion and violence. If the well-being 
of the population is under threat, if security is absent, there is no space for state­
building, nowhere to ground the architecture of a new nation. 
IV THINKING BELOW TilE STATE 
The state as nation-building myth was discussed above. 62 Because ofthe problems 
inherent in a state-centric view, it follows that the design process for the legal 
architecture of nation-building merits adjustment. At the core of this adjustment, in 
this writer's view, is thinking below the state. This requires adopting a standpoint for 
the appraisal of law that penetrates below the easily identifiable surface. Oliver 
Wendell Holmes reflected similar thinking, when he famously wrote: 
It is perfectly proper to regard and study the law simply as a great anthropological 
doclllllent. It is proper to resort to it to discover what ideals of society have been 
strong enough to reach that final form of expression, or what have been the changes 
in dominant ideals from century to century. [Law is] an exercise in the 
morphology and transformation of human ideas. 63 
Vibrant customary communities and micro legal systems function below the radar 
of failed and weak states. These communities merit attention because within them 
human rights and development are denied or achieved, through them demands are 
made upon the world community, and many communities reject certain organizing 
principles ofworld public order including the basic international human rights codex. 
Lawyers engaged in failed state and post-conflict reconstruction must acknowledge 
individuals and their communities which provide and protect fundamental values and 
upon which all governance rests. Whether in functioning or deeply pathological states, 
people's values are indulged or deprived in smaller communities that are mere micro­
participants in the world community, but whose participation can occasionally produce 
broad and intense effects. 64 In all communities, the ultimate systemic unit is the 
person. 
59. See James L. Cavallaro, Looking Backward to Address the Future? Transitional Justice, Rising 
Crime, and Nation-Building, 60 ME. L. REv. 461,462 (2008). 
60. Id. at 464. 
61. Id. 
62. See supra Part II. 
63. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REv. 443,444 (1899). 
64. Indeed, "our world is composed of a series of community contexts beginning with the globe as a 
whole and diminishing in territorial range and scope." Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The 
Identification and Appraisal ofDiverse Systems ofPublic Order, 53 AM. J. INT'LL. 1, 10 (1959). 
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Michael Reisman writes in this volume that"[d]evelopment ... implies specific 
scope values with respect to which strategies for securing selective changes are 
invented and against which change-flows in decision structures and in the production 
and distribution of values are constantly evaluated."65 This optic is critical as most 
state-building occurs in failed states where the principal building blocks are com­
munities. When thinking and operating below the state, it becomes apparent that "as 
total systems, societies differ radically in their patterns of values. The differences 
reside not only in hierarchies or priorities-the ordering of values according to 
importance, in some sense-but also in other important modes ofrelationships among 
values. "66 There are important relationships between values, individual decision­
making, and collective community choice. As Talcott Parsons noted, 
[t]he values which come to be constitutive of the structure of a societal system are 
then the conceptions of the desirable type of society held by the members of the 
society ofreference and applied to the particular society ofwhich they are members. 
A value-pattern then defines a direction ofchoice, and consequent conunitrnent 
to action. 67 
A key nation-building development task is thus to appraise the direction of choice 
implicit in value aspirations in communities that are often disconnected from the state. 
In the absence of a functioning state, it is especially important to understand the 
cultural context and to evaluate the deprivation or fulfillment of values which may 
underlie institutional manifestations. 68 Value priorities differ among cultures. And 
institutional practices vary greatly from culture to culture, within and across civiliza­
tions. Even the most traditional community is complex, with multiple value and legal 
systems at work. Working with traditional communities-often the most coherent 
cultural block in failed states-entails the analysis of culture as an "interpretive [task] 
in search of meaning. "69 
Thinking and working below the state means not confusing legal systems with 
legal rules. 70 In any community, rules rest on the surface of the legal system. The real 
dimensions of the system are often found in other places. This is especially apparent 
in traditional villages where customary and formalized councils are both engaged in 
choice-making, in dividing up the weal and woe oflife. 71 One must come to terms with 
65. Reisman,supranote4, at310. 
66. Robin M. Williams, Jr., Change and Stability in Values and Value Systems: A Sociological 
Perspective, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN VALUES 15, 17-18 (Milton Rokeach ed., 1979). 
67. Talcott Parsons, On the Concept of Value-Commitments, 38 Soc. INQUIRY 135, 136 (1968) 
(citation omitted). 
68. See generally FRANCISMADINGDENG, 'fRADffiON AND MODERNIZATION: A CHALLENGEFORLAW 
AMONG TIIE DINKA OF TIIE SUDAN (1971) (applying a contextual analysis to institutions within tribal 
communities, using the Dinka people as a case study). 
69. CLIFFORDGEERTZ, THEINTERPRETATIONOFCULTURES 5 (1973). 
70. As Bronislaw Malinowski urged, "[t]he true problem is not to study how human life submits to 
rules-it simply does not; the real problem is how the rules become adapted to life." BRONISLAW 
MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY 127 (Routledge & Kegan Paul1966) (1926). 
71. See W. Michael Reisman, Law from the Policy Perspective, in MYRES S. McDOUGAL & W. 
MICHAEL REIS:MAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
CONTE:MPORARYPERSPECTIVE 1, 6-9 (1981). 
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other processes within the culture and the society if one is to truly understand law in 
context.72 A legal system may have more to do with custom, religion, or tradition than 
with what might be considered modem social conventions. Unwritten law, emanating 
from political process, is an important feature of community decision-rnaking.73 
There is also a distinction between the terms law and rule oflaw. In nation-build­
ing practice, the latter is typically taken to mean a sector that includes the judiciary, 
ministry ofjustice, lawyers, legal codes, mechanisms, and practices that regulate public 
and private life. 74 A group of scholars has offered a "rule oflaw" definition that they 
believe affords a more synergistic approach to law and nation-building: 
The ''rule oflaw" describes a state of affairs in which the state successfully mono­
polizes the means ofviolence, and in which most people, most ofthe time, choose to 
resolve disputes in a manner consistent with the procedurally fair, neutral, and 
universally applicable rules, and in a manner that respects fimdarnental human rights 
norms (such as prohibitions on racial, ethnic, religious and gender discrimination, 
torhrre, slavery, prolonged arbitrary detentions, and extrajudicial killings). In the 
context oftoday's globally interconnected world, this requires modem and effective 
legal institutions and codes, and it also requires a widely shared cultural and political 
conunitrnent to the values nnderlying these institutions and codes. 75 
Thinking and acting below the state means engaging microlegal processes because 
"law, real law, is found in all human relations, from the simplest, briefest encounter 
between two people to the most inclusive and permanent type of interaction."76 
Accordingly, "[l]aw is a property of interaction. Real law is generated, reinforced, 
changed and terminated continually in the course of almost all of human activity."77 
This law, termed "microlaw" by Michael Reisman, "manifests a constitutional 
dimension[,] ... a constitutive process: part of every decision is concerned, not with 
the immediate decision, but with the structure of decision-making itself "78 Through 
expectations, reciprocity, and retaliation within those communities that function 
independently of formal institutions, "[m ]icrolaw is effective and sanctioned. "79 The 
72. John Henry Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) ofthe Civil Law and the Common 
Law, in NEWPERSPECTIVESFORACO:MMONLAWOFEUROPE 195, 222-29 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1978). 
As Merryman observes, 
if we are really interested in knowing something about the legal system in any society we 
quickly have to expand our vision to include the law machine-the complex of legal 
structures, actors and processes. We will not get very far in that effort by studying merely 
the rules of law. 
Id. at 227. 
73. Diogenes, discussing Plato's view on the law, observed that "there is a Mitten and an unMitten 
law. The one by which we regulate our constitutions in our cities is the Mitten law; that which arises from 
custom, is the unwritten law." DIOGENESLAERTIUS, THELNESAND OPINIONS OFE:MINENTPHII.OSOPHERS 
143 (C.D. Yonge trans., 1853). 
74. See DOBBINSET AL., BEGINNER'S GUIDE, supra note 2, at 73-74. 
75. STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 2, at 78. 
76. W. MICHAELREIS:MAN, LAWINBRIEFENCOUNTERS 2 (1999). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
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legal architects ofnation-building must plan for and take account of fhese micro-legal 
processes. 
In this Symposium, Thomas Barfield considers microlaw, multiple legal systems, 
and the need to devote close attention to customary law in nation-building. He writes, 
Afghanistan's restoration ofthe rule oflaw has set in motion a renewed debate about 
fimdamental rights and legal principles that has not been seen in the West since the 
time of the Enlightenment: \Vho is justice for? \Vho has the right to seek 
compensation or justice? Does the state or the individual have priority in seeking 
justice and delivering punishment? Is law a human creation or is it rooted in divine 
authority?80 
The problem, as Barfield observes, is that "so many areas of Afghanistan have 
operated without (or outside of) formal government institutions for a very long time. "81 
Neither international law nor state law has had traction at the local level. In order to 
know the law in Afghanistan, one cannot solely rely on formal agreements and other 
textual statements. 
In addition, one must also observe habitual behavior. Behavior which in the 
beginning might be considered unlawful, if repeated fhrough a period of time, might 
become regarded as lawful. To make the distinction requires observance of a flow of 
behavior and a flow ofwords. 82 The fundamental role of the state in legal prescription 
and application is questioned by many Afghans who wonder, "[i]s state authority a 
good idea? Who should set fhe terms of agreement? Who should determine the rights 
and the wrongs?"83 As with many populations that have survived state failure, for most 
Afghans legal life does not unfold with reference to formal codes and institutions. Yet, 
as Barfied argues, 
[T]he major role ofthe international conununity has been in aiding the reconstruction 
ofthe Afghan state . One reason that Afghan society has survived so many years 
ofturmoil has been its ability to govern itself at the local level even in the absence of 
state institutions. The international conununityshould take advantage ofthis strength 
by recognizing that most problems are not solved in the formal judicial institutions 
but rather informally. 84 
Thus, close attention must be accorded to the cultures that shape communities and 
people apart from the state. 85 Viewing cultures and civilizations via a horizontal optic 
alone reveals only surface identifications. With a vertical examination, the full 
complexity ofoverlapping and conflicting identifications accompanied by expectations 
and demands become apparent. Normative systems are layered. Hence, levels of 
80. Thomas Barfield, Culture and Custom in Nation-Building: Law in Afghanistan, 60 ME. L. REv. 
347, 348 (2008). 
81. Id. 
82. See W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, The Harold D. 
Lasswell Memorial Lecture (April24, 1981), in 75 AM. Soc'YINT'LL. PRoc.101, 108-11. 
83. Barfield, supra note 80, at 348. 
84. Id. at373. 
85. See id. Culture "is the term that characterizes the most distinctive patterns ofvalue distribution and 
institutional practice to be found in the world community." MYREs S. McDouGAL & HAROLD D. 
LASSWELL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 20 (1960). 
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governance, constitutional texts, and formal institutions are features of a context that 
include, but are not limited to, the state. This discernment operation can be especially 
vexing to those who work with non-Western communities, where social processes 
evolve below the surface of the community. 
Social groups within the state typically receive scant attention from practitioners 
and scholars. For example, as is explained by Tracy E. Higgins and Rachel Fink in this 
Symposium, in every nation-building context, fhe family is part ofthe legal architecture 
through "fhe relationship between family structure and the overarching social structure 
of the nation-state."86 The authors note fhat "[t]he family comprises the fundamental 
principle of social organization in all societies, across a wide range of culture and 
political fonns." 87 Family and social hierarchy, including hierarchy and power 
constellations, may be "reproduced in the structure of the nation. "88 Gender roles and 
particular manifestations of family structure may be reinforced by long-standing 
customary law. 
In placing family law at the center of a legal architecture of nation-building, 
Higgins and Fink note that "the social institution offhe family and the legal framework 
that defines it embody power relations that, in turn, help to shape fhe larger polity. 
[and] may figure in important ways in fhe struggle for national identity that often takes 
place contemporaneously with nation-building. "89 The authors approach nation­
building differently than do lawyers and scholars who are accustomed to a world of 
formal institutions, codified law, and top-down mefhods. When a "below the state" 
observational standpoint is incorporated and adopted, nation-building lawyers can 
better calibrate the tools and jurisprudence they bring to the enterprise in order to 
achieve commonly sought outcomes. 
V HUMAN RIGHTS FOR HUMAN DIGNITY 
The fundamental goal of nation-building is achieving human dignity for the 
beneficiary population. 90 In fhis Symposium, Michael Reisman postulates the goal of 
a world order of human dignity, and this "involves increasing the aggregate 
participation in fhe shaping and sharing of all values. "91 That is the full nation-building 
task. In modem state-building practice, this means constructing a human rights culture 
in compliance with international humanrights standards, and national and international 
protection mechanisms as strategies to achieve human dignity outcomes. In many 
instances, populations in failed and disintegrated states have suffered human rights 
abuses for generations. There is evidence that deep and extensive human rights 
86. Tracy E. Higgins &Rachel Fink, GenderandNation-Building: Family Law as Legal Architecture, 
60 ME. L. REv. 375, 385 (2008). 
87. Id. at386. 
88. Id. at 407. 
89. Id. at 377. 
90. According to scholars Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, "[t]he essential meaning of 
human dignity ... can be succinctly stated: it refers to a social process in which values are widely and not 
narrowly shared, and in which private choice, rather than coercion, is emphasized as the predominant 
modality of power." McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 64, at 11. 
91. Reisman, supra note 4, at 312. 
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deprivations over time are a factor in state collapse. 92 In post-conflict reconstruction 
and nation-building, human rights design must be integrated at the outset and 
considered within every project that will have an impact on the beneficiary population. 
Human rights have been central to state-building and post-conflict reconstruction 
since fhe end ofthe Second World War when, with the Holocaust fresh in their minds, 
delegates to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco decided fhat how a 
government treated its own people on its own soil would no longer be its own business. 
The constitutive document of the new organization, the United Nations Charter, 
reaffirmed "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worfh of the human 
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small. "93 The 
framers of the Charter recognized evolving demands for humanrights, postulating and 
prescribing new protections for fundamental rights of the individual regardless of the 
posture of the state in which that citizen lived. 94 The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) has been called a Magna Carta for all humanity. 95 It is the constitutive 
text at fhe core of the International Bill of Human Rights and at the core of fhe legal 
architecture of nation-building. 96 
Nation-building work cannot be undertaken without incorporating human rights 
standards and obligations, as well as the mechanisms and arrangements for promotion 
and protection. It cannot proceed without the participation of fhe human rights 
"movement" that is largely drawn from civil society. Building a human rights culture 
requires partnerships and national human rights institutions as a component of the 
architectural design. 97 Human rights, as a component of the legal architecture of 
nation-building, are addressed explicitly and implicitly by each contributor to this 
Symposium. 
The issue of culturally particular perspectives and demands as a challenge to 
universal standards is a human rights problem that becomes acute when Western 
92. Much has been Mitten on the connection between widespread human rights abuses over time and 
the collapse of the state. For the situation in Afghanistan, see generally U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council 
[ECOSOC], Report of the Independent Counsel on International Human Rights on the Human Rights 
Situation in Afghanistan, U.N. Doc. AIC.3/42/8 (Nov. 17, 1987); EDWARD GIRARDET & JONATIIAN 
WALTER, AFGHANISTAN (Charles Norchi & Miiwais Massood eds., 2004); A HELSINKI WATCH REPORT, 
"TEARS, BWOD AND CRIES": HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE TilE INvASION (1984); A HELSINKI 
WATCH!ASIA WATCH REPORT, BY AIL PARTIES TO TilE CONFliCT: VIOIATIONSOFTIIELAWS OFWARIN 
AFGHANISTAN (1988); Norah Niland, Justice Postponed: The Marginalization of Human Rights in 
Afghanistan, in NATION-BUilDING UNRAVELED? AID, PEACE AND JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN 61 (Antonio 
Donini, Norah Niland & Karin Wermester eds., 2004). 
93. U.N. Charter, Preamble. 
94. See Charles Norchi, Human Rights: A Global Common Interest, in THE UNITED NATIONS: 
CONFRONTING TilE CHALLENGES OF AGLOBAL SOCIETY 79 (Jean E. Krasno ed., 2004). 
95. ROBERTF.DRINAN, THEMOBIT.JZATIONOFSHA:ME: AWORLDVIEWOFHUMANRIGHTS11 (2001). 
96. See Fact Sheet, Office oftheHigh Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev. 1), The 
International Bill of Human Rights (June 1996), http://\VW\V.unhcr.ch/htmllmenu6/2/fs2.htm. The 
International Bill ofHuman Rights consists of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, t\vo Optional Protocols and specialized 
international legal instruments. Id. 
97. National human rights institutions, as strategies for building a human rights culture, should be 
considered in nation-building design. See, e.g., Charles H. Norchi, The National Human Rights 
Commission ofIndia as a Value-Creating Institution, in HUMAN RIGHTS: POSITIVE POLICIES IN ASIA AND 
TIIE PACIFIC RIM (John D. Montgomery ed., 1998). 
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countries undertake nation-building programs in non-Western societies. 98 The 
perspectives of certain civilizations seemed wary, if not hostile, to what Richard Falk 
called "the cult of rnodernization"99 with which certain cultures associate the human 
rights system. In distinctly non-Western contexts, perspectives on a range of values 
bearing on human dignity may vary from international legal standards. This is a 
concrete problem which lawyers, including this writer, have confronted innon-Western 
nation-building environments. Its urgency was recently conveyed by Pope Benedict 
XVI in an address to the United Nations General Assembly: 
[T]he Universal Declaration [of Human Rights] ... has enabled different cultures, 
juridical expressions and institutional models to converge armmd a fimdamental 
nucleus of values, and hence of rights. Today, though, efforts need to be redoubled 
in the face of pressure to reinterpret the fmmdat:ions of the Declaration and to 
compromise its inner unity so as to facilitate a move away from the protection of 
hlllllan dignity towards the satisfaction of simple interests, often particular interests. 100 
Burns Weston, writing in this Symposilllll, proposes a practical means for dealing 
with this problem. He argues that "universalist international humanrights law can and 
should serve as a basis for rendering cross-cultural normative judgments." 101 
Historically, deprivations of respect are the roots of abuses suffered by vulnerable 
populations in failed states. Professor Weston proposes "an analytically neutral 
approach for deciding when cultural differences are to be respected and when not. " 102 
He refers to this approach as a "methodology ofrespect, " 103 and urges a "cross-cultural 
dialogue that can yield substantial detailed consensus on the many factual and policy­
oriented questions that absolutely need to be asked by all participants engaged in 
nation-building. " 104 
Additionally, nation-building, particularly in war-tom societies, requires protecting 
refugee populations and the internally displaced. In this Symposium, Rebecca M. M. 
Wallace and Diego Quiroz discuss means for protecting refugees and the internally 
98. Charles H. Norchi, A Pivotal States Human Rights Strategy, in THE PNOTAL STATES: A NEW 
FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. POLICY IN TilE DEVELOPING WORLD 315, 3 27-28 (Robert Chase, Emily Hill & Paul 
Kennedy eds., 1999). 
[S]chism has arisen bet\veen those who believe ideas and institutions are nomos, or made 
by man, and those who believe our ideoethnemes are physis, or imposed by nature or divine 
will. The former view engendered Western civilization from the Enlightenment to the 
present, andwith it human rights. In its extreme form, the latter vie\¥ is a crucial challenge. 
Its triumph would amount to one ofthe most profound value shifts since the Age ofReason. 
And its impact on the planet would be no less significant than when God first spoke to 
Muhammad. 
Id. 
99. Richard Falk, Cultural Foundationsfor the International Protection ofHumanRights, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURALPERSPECTIVES44, 45 (Abdollahi Ahmed An-Naim ed., 1990). 
100. Address ofHis Holiness Benedict XVI to the United Nations General Assembly 2 (April18, 2008) 
(transcript available from the Holy See Press Office). 
101. Bums H. Weston, HumanRightsand Nation-Building in Cross-Cultural Settings, 60 ME. L. REv. 
317, 326 (2008). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at328. 
104. Id. at 346. 
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displaced (IDPs) as a critical nation-building challenge. 105 They "explore the interde­
pendent relationship between post-conflict nation-building on the one hand, and 
refugee repatriation and intrastate reintegration ofiDPs on the other." 106 The authors 
appraise the framework of international protection of refugees through human rights 
law and international refugee law that must serve to guide nation-building actors. They 
write that "[i]n any population of returnees there will be groups that are particularly 
vulnerable. Any successful nation-building exercise must consider these groups and 
implement procedures and programs that effectively address their particular situa­
tions."107 
Human rights must be a key component of the legal architecture of nation­
building because many populations of failed states have been subjected to the Melian 
experience. Thucydides recorded the famous Melian dialogue during the time of the 
Peloponnesian wars. In the dialogue, the Athenians proclaimed that the "strong do 
what they can and the weak suffer what they mus\." 108 There was no human rights 
culture, and the Melians suffered the consequences. For contemporary nation-building, 
the legal architect must address the means and methods of building a human rights 
culture to secure the population early in the design process. 
VI. CAPACITY-BUILDING 
What is the "building" in nation-building? This writer believes it is building the 
capacity ofpeople and their institutions. Among development professionals, capacity 
is understood as the ability ofpeople, organizations, and society to manage their affairs 
successfully. 109 Thus the legal architecture of nation-building should adopt Amartya 
Sen's "capability approach" that he applies to poverty reduction110 The 2005 Paris 
Declaration identified capacity development as an endogenous process, led from within 
a country with donors playing a supporting role. The effective performance of country 
systems-administration, governance, goods and service delivery, a suitable policy, 
regulatory and legal enviromnent for sustainable development-depends on capacity. 111 
105. Rebecca M. M. Wallace and Diego Quiroz, Refugees and Internally Displaced: A Challenge to 
Nation-Building, 60 ME. L. REv. 409 (2008). 
106. Id. at410-11. 
107. Id. at424. 
108. THUCYDIDES, THEPEWPONNESIANWAR 351 (Richard Crawley trans., 1982). 
109. See generally Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development Assistance Committee, 
Reference Document, The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working Towards Good Practice, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/govemance. 
110. AMARTYA SEN, INEQUAUTY REEXAMINED 109 (1992). Amartya Sen considers the concept of 
"development" beyond resource transfer and material well-being. He defines the goal of development as 
increasing the capability of all human beings to achieve what they most value. See generally AMARTYA 
SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM (1999). 
111. Montgomery & Rondinelli, supra note 2, at 235. 

The in-country presence of donor organizations is often a useful means of training civil 

servants and suggesting organization improvements, but the negative impact of its 

temporary nature often contributes to an internal "brain-drain" as higher levels of 

compensation and responsibility attract qualified personnel away from government posts. 

The balance bet\veen offering opportunities to qualified personnel and drawing do\VIl the 

resources of the public service requires close attention. Using existing administrative 

machinery rather than creating ne\V organizations is a valuable means toward that balance, 
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This is a way to solve the problem ofwhat Fukuyama calls "weak states and the black 
hole of public administration. " 112 
Sustainable capacity-building depends upon a core skill: individual decision­
making. This is critical for a range of optimal outcomes, including an independent 
judiciary, competent and responsive legal professionals, adequate public health, 
inclusive education, and the full range of ministerial and provincial government 
administration. Building indigenous, individual decision-making capacity should be 
a component of the legal architecture ofnation-building because "[l]aw is a process of 
human beings making choices."113 Nation-building lawyers, who become decision 
specialists through years of training and practice, are best positioned to help develop 
this core capacity upon which the new state will rise or fall. The ability of a state to 
produce value outcomes for a population turns on the decision capacity of individuals 
at every level of social structure but, in particular, at the base. This core capacity is a 
prerequisite for generating the complete range ofvalue outcomes described by Michael 
Reisman in this Symposium: power, well-being, skill, respect, wealth, enlightenment, 
affection, and rectitude. 114 
Capacity-building efforts should explicitly recognize the community or group's 
values to help them guide their views of their own futures. 115 The impoverished and 
dispossessed are too often treated as objects of state-building rather than as genuinely 
participating subjects. However, they are agents of their choices. 116 As one 
development expert has observed, "The poor want desperately to have their voices 
heard, to make decisions, and not to always receive the law handed down from 
above."117 The goal is to build locally-driven, owned, and thus sustainable processes 
in select sectors amidst widespread conditions of physical insecurity and socio­
economic deprivation. 
Another scholar argues that rather than focus upon services, infrastructure, and 
capital transfers, donor countries and international organizations must define capacity 
itself as the primary objective of all development assistance. 118 This can help avoid the 
problem of"runaway state-building," described as the "rapid expansion in the size of 
the state administration without appreciable gains in its effectiveness [whereby] states 
continue to underperform, and in some cases have even declined in their capacity for 
once disruptive relics of the past are purged from office. 
I d. 
112. FUKUYAMA, STATEBUTI.,DING, supra note 2, at 43. 
113. W. MICHAEL REIS:MAN & A. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING LAW 
595 (1987). 
114. See Reisman, supra note 4, at 311-13. 
115. See generally Charles H. Norchi & Karuna Chibber, A Technical Note for Value-Based 
Participatory Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation in Community-Driven Development (World Bank 
Group, Washington, D.C., May 20, 2003) (discussing the guidelines for Value-Based Participatory 
Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation in Community-Driven Development). 
116. See W. Michael Reisman,A Jurisprudence from the Perspective ofthe "Political Superior," 23 
N. KY. L. REv. 605, 619 (1996). Reisman suggests a methodological approach to building the decision 
capacity of the disempowered. Id. 
117. DEEPA NARAYANET AL., VOICES OF TIIEPOOR: CRYING OUT FOR CHANGE 281 (2000). 
118. See FUKUYA:MA, STATE Bun,DING, supra note 2, at 82-91. 
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governance. " 119 The risk is building the capacity of international consultants and non­
governmental organizations while people remain disernpowered and fragile states 
remain weak. It is important to be sensitive to approaches that create new external 
dependencies an outcome of what one expert famously termed, "The Cartel of Good 
Intentions."120 This "cartel" is the enormous international development technocracy 
that is self-perpetuating and feeds on large foreign assistance projects while producing 
local dependency. 121 In the least developed countries it has contributed to minimal 
state capacity, and economic growth, thwarted service delivery in an inclusive and 
accountable manner, and enhanced the risk of political instability and state collapse. 
The cure for runaway state-building is real capacity-building. 122 
The contributors to this Symposium address a broad spectrum ofcapacity-building 
challenges. One challenge, not explicitly treated in this volume, is constitutional text 
drafting for new states. 123 Lawyers engaged in nation-building are especially attuned 
to the constitutive process, even if they do not participate in drafting the text. The 
process is at least as important in the life of the new state as the text. 124 The legal 
architecture must account for the observations of Donald L. Horowitz: 
There are two important questions in post -conflict constitution making, and at present 
neither ofthem has a definitive or uniformly accepted answer. The first relates to the 
best configuration of institutions to adopt in order to ameliorate the problem of 
intergroup conflict. The second concerns the process most apt to produce the best 
configuration of institutions, whatever it might be. 125 
There are multiple answers to these questions depending on the context, methods, and 
jurisprudence that lawyers bring to the problem. 126 A constitution is a journey, not a 
119. CONOR O'DWYER, RUNAWAY STAIE-BUilDING 1 (2006). 
120. William Easterly, The Carle! ofGood Intentions: The Problem ofBureaucracy in Foreign Aid, 5 
PoL'YREFoRM 223, 226 (2003). 
121. See Peter Boone, Politics and the Effectiveness ofForeign Aid, 40 EUR. EcoN. REv. 289, 289-94 
(1996); James Bovard, The Continuing Failure ofForeign Aid (Cato Inst., Policy Analysis No. 65, 1986); 
Craig Burnside & David Dollar, Aid, Policies and Growth, 90 AM. EcoN. REv. 84 7, 847-48 (2000); see 
generally WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSNE QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOWSTS' ADVENTURES AND 
MISADVENTURES IN TIIE TROPICS (2001) (discussing how economic growth in the tropics responds to 
incentives). 
122. A possible solution is "an 'organic minimalist' approach to legal reconstruction-an approach 
aimed at efficientlyfocusing resources in away that empowers the organic legal system ofthe target nation 
without undermining the legitimacy ofthe judiciary and other government institutions." Stigall, supra note 
58,at1. 
123. The more important constitutive process ofwhich a constitution is a part, however, is explicitly 
treated in this Symposium. See e.g., Reisman, supra note 4, at 312; Barfield, supra note 80, at 349-51. 
124. Norchi, supra note 37, at 115 ("The tradition of creating and adopting a constitution involves a 
process of authoritative decision-making in which members of a community clarify and implement their 
common interest."). 
125. DonaldL. Horowitz, Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-Conflict States, 
49 WM. &MARYL. REV. 1213, 1213 (2008). 
126. See DonaldL. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Process, in THEARCIITTECTURE 
OF DEMOCRACY: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, AND DEMOCRACY 15, 19 (Andrew 
Reynolds ed., 2002) ("If there is a subject called constitutional design, then there must be alternative 
constitutional designs. Assuredly there are, but even now most constitutional drafters and reformers are, 
at best, only vaguely informed by anything resembling an articulate theory of their enterprise."). 
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moment. For a nascent state emerging from collapse, an often overlooked role for the 
nation-building lawyer is to help build local capacity to make the journey127 
The pace of capacity-building will necessarily turn on levels of crisis and conflict. 
In this volume, Michael Reisman writes of different levels of developmental capacity 
across communities. 
At one extreme, the most minimal form of development capacity obtains when a 
territorial conununity lacks institutional or fimct:ional means for locating itself, with 
some degree of realism, in its environment and flow of events and of even clarifying 
andprojecting goals and strategies for securing an approximation ofhlllllan dignity. 128 
Nation-building lawyers may encounter this as the faux state-a polity whose real 
power lies in diffuse pockets disconnected from the center-where effective control 
and authority of the government is confined to a narrow space. A constitution might 
be in place, government ministries might buzz with activity, yet warlords and their 
private armies control provinces, engage in banditry, and "tax" commerce. The faux 
state problem must be addressed by intense indigenous capacity-building. 
Capacity-building in many new states may be burdened by debts incurred by 
previous, often outlaw, regimes. The problem is appraised in this volume by Lee C. 
Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati who write "in this one area-debt contracts-the former 
despot will continue to keep a chokehold on the country long after the devil and his 
other works have been buried. " 129 The "debt obligations incurred by the prior govern­
ment in the name of the state, " 130 merits greater sustained attention from the nation­
building community. It is a problem that is an obstruction to capacity-building. More­
over, a large part of the solution lies in building indigenous capacity that possesses 
sufficient debt-contracting and other related skills. 
Among the pathologies of failed and post-conflict states is the absence of 
commercial law. In this Symposium, Michael J. Stepek writes on commercial law as 
a component of the legal architecture of nation-building. 131 There is a dire need for 
legal standards to hold public institutions accountable. This accountability is a key to 
economic development because "legal institutions enable commercial partners to 
engage in sophisticated transactions." 132 The ability to conduct transactions, provide 
professional services, and to enter into legally binding agreements requires robust legal 
institutions and capable staffs. As Mr. Stepek describes, this is an enormous capacity­
building challenge that has been fraught with difficulty. 
127. A method used by policy-oriented lalN)'ers is the Decision Seminar which this Author has found 
useful in state-building field applications. See generally Andre\¥ R. Willard & Charles H. Norchi, The 
Decision Seminar as an Instrument of Power and Enlightenment, 14 PoL. PSYCHOL. 575 (1993) (an 
account of a Decision Seminar conducted to help build governance, constitution making, and decision 
capacity for the Afghan government-in-exile and other key participants of the period). 
128. Reisman, supra note 4, at 310. 
129. Lee C. Buchheit &G. Mitu Gulati, Odious DebtsandNation-Building: When the Incubus Departs, 
60 ME. L. REv. 477,479 (2008). 
130. Id. 
131. See generally Michael J. Stepek, The Importance ofCommercial Law in the Legal Architecture 
ofPost-Conflict "New" States, 60 ME. L. REv. 487 (2008). 
132. I d. at 494. 
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John L. Douglas writes in this volume about a related concern: the role of a 
banking system in nation-building. This is an important capacity-building task because 
a "banking system functions as the heart and lifeblood ofany functioning economy. " 133 
Mr. Douglas explains why "one no more builds a nation by establishing a banking 
system than one builds a nation by writing a constitution. " 134 The banking system 
requires concurrent attention to other capacity building tasks: "a legal system that 
respects contracts and agreements, honoring the rights ofboth debtors and creditors . 
a judiciary that follows the rule oflaw[,] a governmentthat understands the importance 
of strong, healthy banks ... and a legal framework within which they can operate. " 135 
This component of the legal architecture of nation-building is critical because, as Mr. 
Douglas writes, a "healthy banking system ... not only helps build a nation for what 
it does, it helps build a nation for what it requires. " 136 
There are myriad opportunities for lawyers and non-lawyers to help build the 
capacity of failed states and of the people who live in them. This Symposium issue 
includes contributions by volunteer lawyers associated with the International Senior 
Lawyers Project, who describe their rich field experiences. These lawyers recount 
their capacity-building efforts undertaken with a wide range of public and private 
actors. Each volunteer lawyer carne away from the experience as seasoned nation­
builders with profound insights. As one volunteer reflected after her experience,"[ t ]he 
size of the gap between the law on the books and its access by and application to all 
levels of a society is one crucial indicator of a country's progress on the rule of law 
continuurn."137 We are reminded that important capacity-building work is not the 
unique preserve of the civil servants of international organizations, government 
officials, NGO staff, and law firms. There is an emerging cadre of nation-builders 
motivated by nothing more than a custodial sense for the greater common interest. 
Capacity-building recognizes that people "have the latent capabilities needed for 
development but those latent capabilities need to be nurtured and brought to fruition 
if the people are to attain their aspiration, goal, or promise."138 Nation-builders must 
convey a sincerity of purpose and commitment to populations who worry that 
compassion fatigue will set in and who fear that they will be victims of a nation­
building exit strategy139 Such populations have been orphaned before, usually by 
powerful nation-building Western states. In the myth of Prometheus, as the Greek 
gods were molding the first mortal beings from fire and earth, they equipped them with 
various resources to survive. However, those mortals with reason, the humans, were 
left with few powers. Thus Prometheus stole fire from the god Hephaestus and wisdom 
in the arts from Athena and gave these powers to man. But, in allocating powers, 
133. John L. Douglas, The Role of a Banking System in Nation-Building, 60 ME. L. REv. 511, 512 
(2008). 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 513. 
137. Linda D. McGill, Measuring the Rule ofLaw in India: A Volunteer Lawyer's Experience, 60 ME. 
L. REv. 537,537-38 (2008). 
138. DEANWIT.,UAMS, REALLEADERSIITP 223 (2005). 
139. See Charles H. Norchi, A New Start in Afghanistan, INT'L HERAlD TRIBUNE, Oct. 13, 2004, 
available at http:/lwww .iht.com/articles/2004/1 0/12/opinion/ednorchi .php (arguing that an Afghan election 
must not be an exit strategy). 
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Prometheus parsed skill, allotting it to some people and not others. 140 He skipped the 
poorest and most marginal communities. In our age, the orphans of Prometheus are 
found in failing, failed, and collapsed states. Building the skill capacity of the new 
Promethean orphans is a critical nation-building objective. 
VII. THE LAWYER AS ARCHITECT 
Nation-building tasks now benefit from the contributions of lawyers. Their 
profound challenge is to fulfill the human rights and development of populations on 
the perilous journey from real estate to nation-state. 141 This is not entirely new legal 
territory, but the complex challenges stimulate new approaches, methods, and 
innovative combinations. Itwill occur to the readers of this Symposium that if a legal 
architecture of nation-building is emerging, it is because lawyers, such as the 
contributors to this volume, are the architects. They are lawyer -architects by virtue of 
applying their legal disciplines, their deep contextual understanding, their problem­
oriented postures, and their multi-method agility to this vexing problem of the Public 
Order of the World Community. 
Even for the most agile and creative lawyers, this pursuit is remarkable because 
there are few guides for the lawyer as nation-building architec\. 142 The problem, as 
historian Eric Hobsbawm once described, is "the old maps and charts which guided 
human beings, singly and collectively, through life no longer represent the landscape 
through which we move, the sea on which we sail."143 Hence lawyers engaged in state­
building are devising new maps and blueprints that are the emerging legal architecture 
of nation-building. The most effective and seasoned lawyers employ "a set of 
conceptions and working methods that permit and help them to grasp the context in 
which they operate, the objectives they are trying to achieve, the obstructions likely to 
be encountered and some appropriate method for making choices." 144 Working in 
fluid and often contested environments, these lawyer-architects arrive at a "way of 
establishing and appraising social goals and values as a necessary step in determining 
how problems should be solved."145 In this manner, they are working in the common 
interest of failed states, their sub-communities, and the world community. 146 
In this earlytwenty-firstcentury, our diacritic world community still holds pockets 
of neglected darkness-failed and failing states, conflict zones within porous 
boundaries of faux states, and sub-state communities that have never benefited from 
the fruits of development. These places devoid of human dignity present problems. 
140. See PIA TO, PROTAGORAS 13-16 (C.C.W. Taylor trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1976). 
141. See Charles Norchi, From Real Estate to Nation-State: Who will Lead Afghanistan?, DISSENT, 
Winter 2006, at 24. 
142. See Horowitz, supra note 35, at 270 ("There are enormous disjunctions bet\veen what severely 
divided societies require and the methods that are used to decide on the institutions that will govern those 
societies."). 
143. ERICHOBSBAWM, AGE OF EXTREMES 16 (1994). 
144. REIS:MAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 113, at 10. 
145. Id. 
146. See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWElL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
WORLD PUBuc ORDER 409 (1980) (defining an "interest" as "a pattern of demands for values plus the 
supporting expectations about the conditions under which these demands can be fulfilled"). 
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They are problems for the people who live in them, and they are problems for the 
people of the world community. Such places of disintegration and desperation are 
prime platforms to export violence. They swell and simmer below what may resemble 
a functioning state. \Vhen states disintegrate, and when communities are ultra­
marginalized, human dignity dissipates. The effects can be global. A neglected 
community that descends into extreme insecurity can facilitate the application ofpower 
to distant places. Since September 11, 2001, this is how personal insecurity traveled 
with the world politics of our time. We are now learning that the long-term solutions 
are in nation-building, fulfilling human rights, and achieving development. 
Each contributor to this Symposium addresses some aspect of the state-building 
problem as profoundly framed by Sigmund Freud: 
[R]eplacernent of the power of the individual by the power of the conununity 
constitutes the decisive step in civilization .... The first requisite of civilization, 
therefore, is that ofjustice-that is, the assurance that a law once made will not be 
broken in favour of an individual .... The final outcome should be a rule oflaw. 
which leaves no one ... at the mercy ofbrute force. 147 
For the lawyer as nation-building architect, that is the ultimate challenge. In Plato's 
Republic there were Guardians who "were entirely eager to do what they believe to be 
"
148advantageous to the city and would in no way be willing to do what is not. Our age 
of seemingly permanent reconstruction urgently needs guardian lawyers. 149 As Plato's 
Guardians were charged with looking upon his constructed commonwealth as their 
special concern, today's guardian lawyers would be custodians of nascent common­
wealths under construction. They would be the lawyer architects of nation-building. 
That guardian ideal is conveyed by the authors who have contributed to this 
Symposium, Nation-Building: A Legal Architecture? 
147. SIGMUND FREUD, CNlliZATION ANDITSDISCONTENTS42 (1961). 
148. PIATO,supranote10,at92. 
149. I am grateful to historian GeoffreyKabaservice for the guardianship metaphorwhich he used in his 
seminal work on pivotal figures ofthe American liberal establishment. See GEOFFREYKABASERVICE, THE 
GUARDIANS: KINGMAN BREWSTER, HIS CIRCLE, AND TilE RISE OF TilE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT (2004). 
